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TESTING THE STICKY INFORMATION PHILLIPS CURVE
Olivier Coibion*
Abstract—I consider the empirical evidence for the sticky information
model relative to the basic sticky price model, conditional on historical
measures of inflation forecasts. The estimated structural parameters are
inconsistent with an underlying sticky information model and the sticky
information Phillips curve is statistically dominated by the new Keynesian
Phillips curve. I find that the poor performance of the sticky information
approach is driven by two key elements. First, the sticky information
model underestimates inflation in the 1970s and overestimates inflation
since the 1980s. Second, predicted inflation from the sticky information
model is excessively smooth.
I. Introduction
EMPIRICAL research on the response of the economy tomonetary policy shocks has identified important styl-
ized facts that can be used to differentiate among competing
models.1 The delayed response of inflation to such shocks
has been of primary interest, because the basic sticky price
model cannot replicate this key feature of the data.2 As a
result, much recent research has been devoted to developing
models that can match this stylized fact. While some of this
work has been done within the context of sticky price
models, others have proposed dropping the assumption of
sticky prices entirely and focusing instead on informational
rigidities.3 A leading example is the sticky information
model of Mankiw and Reis (2002), in which firms update
their information infrequently according to a time-
dependent process but are free to change prices at all times.
The gradual diffusion of information across the popula-
tion, the key assumption in the sticky information model,
has received some empirical support. For example, Carroll
(2003) estimates the rate of diffusion of information from
professional forecasters to the general population from an
epidemiological model and finds results in line with those
assumed by Mankiw and Reis. Dopke et al. (2008) provide
similar support for the diffusion of information from fore-
casters to households in European countries. Mankiw and
Reis (2003) estimate a sticky information model applied to
wage setting and find that the average wage setter updates
his or her information about once per year. Khan and Zhu
(2006) directly estimate the structural parameters of the
sticky information model applied to price setting and con-
clude that the evidence is not inconsistent with firms updat-
ing their information approximately once a year. Klenow
and Willis (2007) find microlevel evidence consistent with
firms responding to old information in price-setting deci-
sions.
The empirical approach used in this paper follows the
distinction drawn by Carroll (2003) between the formation
of expectations by professional forecasters and the diffusion
of those forecasts to the population. Sticky information is
interpreted as a gradual (time-dependent) diffusion of fore-
casts from professional forecasters to firms, combined with
the additional assumption that price changes are costless.
The sticky information Phillips curve (SIPC) then gives the
relationship between inflation and the output gap condi-
tional on past forecasts of the current state. One can simi-
larly derive the new Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC)
conditional on professional forecasts by assuming a time-
dependent process for changing prices with the additional
assumption of costless acquisition of professional forecasts.
The purpose of writing these models conditional on inflation
forecasts is to separate two issues: whether forecasts are
consistent with rational expectations and whether price-
setting decisions should best be modeled as sticky prices or
sticky information. Previous work on assessing the validity
of these models has imposed rational expectations on the
forecasts, making the empirical exercise a joint test of
price-setting decisions and rational expectations. The ap-
proach taken here allows us to separate the two and focus on
the question of the validity of each price-setting assumption
conditional on observed historical forecasts.
This distinction proves to have important implications for
the empirical results. Whereas previous work has found
little evidence strongly favoring sticky prices or sticky
information, the results of this paper are strongly at odds
with the sticky information assumptions. When historical
survey measures of inflation forecasts are used, the esti-
mated structural parameters of the SIPC point to no statis-
tically significant degree of information rigidity; moreover,
there is no discernible link between the nominal side and the
real side of the economy. The SIPC, since the 1970s, can
thus be rejected on structural grounds. Second, the SIPC is
also strongly rejected statistically in favor of the NKPC, the
very model that it was supposed to replace.
I show that this rejection of the SIPC is due to two
elements. The first is a real-time forecast error effect.
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1 See Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999).
2 Mankiw (2001) emphasizes this point. Other failures of the basic sticky
price model include predicting costless deflations, economic booms under
preannounced credible disinflations (Ball, 1994), and failing to reproduce
the positive correlations between changes in inflation and the level of
output.
3 In the context of sticky price models, Gali and Gertler (1999) add
rule-of-thumb firms to a sticky price model and derive a hybrid NKPC.
Trabandt (2005) shows that such a model can yield a delayed response of
inflation to monetary policy shocks. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(2005) allow sticky price firms to index their prices to some measure of
inflation in non-reoptimizing periods. Calvo, Celasun, and Kumhof (2003)
allow sticky price firms to choose a reset price and a rate at which prices
will be automatically increased.
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Professional forecasters consistently underestimated infla-
tion in the 1970s but overestimated inflation in the 1980s
and 1990s. This feature of forecasts is increasingly true at
longer forecast horizons. Because the SIPC places signifi-
cant weight on older forecasts of current inflation, this leads
to predicted inflation being too low in the 1970s and too
high since the 1980s. The real-time forecast error effect
plays an important role in explaining why the estimated
degree of information rigidity is close to zero. Importantly,
this effect is absent when one uses in-sample forecasts, as
implicitly done in Dupor, Kitamura, and Tsuruga (forthcom-
ing), Kiley (2007), Korenok (2008), and Korenok, Rad-
chenko, and Swanson (2007). Thus, whereas previous work
has demonstrated that relying on historical inflation fore-
casts helps the NKPC empirically (see Roberts, 1995,
1997), I show that it impairs the ability of the SIPC to match
the data.
A second contribution of the paper is to identify another
implication of the SIPC at odds with the data, which I refer
to as the inflation inertia effect: predicted inflation from the
SIPC using the preferred parameter estimates of Mankiw
and Reis is excessively persistent and insufficiently volatile.
This result, unlike the real-time forecast error effect, is
robust to the forecasts used. The basic sticky price model
comes much closer to matching both the persistence and
volatility of inflation conditional on inflation forecasts and
the output gap. This result is particularly surprising given
that the sticky information model was designed explicitly to
account for inflation inertia missing from the sticky price
model.
The paper also attempts to explain the fact that estimates
of the degree of information rigidity from the SIPC are very
sensitive to the time period. While the estimates over the
whole sample point to no information rigidity at all, the
subsample estimates using data since 1984 are consistent
with firms acquiring new forecasts less than once a year on
average, although the SIPC continues to be dominated by
the NKPC statistically even in the subsample analysis. I
argue that the high estimated levels of information rigidity
are likely to be capturing the fact that forecast errors were
highly predictable over this time period. Because the struc-
tural form of the SIPC is very similar to tests of the
rationality of the forecasts, periods of predictable forecast
errors can mistakenly lead one to conclude that there is a
high level of sticky information in price-setting decisions
when in fact there is none. I illustrate this using the sticky
price and imperfect information model of Erceg and Levin
(2003), which delivers a pattern of predictable forecast
errors in subsamples similar to that observed in the data,
even though there is no delay in the diffusion of information
from professional forecasters to firms (i.e., no sticky infor-
mation in the model). I estimate the SIPC in Monte Carlo
simulations of this model and closely replicate the empirical
findings from the U.S. data over the whole time sample, as
well as since the mid-1980s.
These results thus cast doubt on the empirical support for
sticky information in price-setting decisions and are more
consistent with a sticky price model. However, an important
caveat is that the estimation is conditional on historical
forecasts. These measures exhibit predictable forecast errors
over short horizons as well as disagreement among fore-
casters, features that are consistent with informational ri-
gidities at the level of professional forecasters. Thus, one
should be wary of concluding that information rigidities are
unimportant. Instead, one possible interpretation of these
results is that modeling firms as sticky price agents that keep
close track of professional forecasts could be an adequate
representation, but more care needs to be devoted to under-
standing the rigidities affecting the formation of expecta-
tions by professional forecasters. The nature of these infor-
mational rigidities remains an open question: perhaps sticky
information as suggested by Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers
(2003), imperfect information as in Erceg and Levin (2003),
or some alternative mechanism.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II
presents the econometric approach used to estimate the
SIPC as well as the nonnested model tests. Section III
presents and discusses the baseline results. Section IV
considers some robustness checks, while section V contains
a discussion and interpretation of the results. Section VI
concludes.
II. Empirical Approach
The goal of the paper is to evaluate the empirical support
for the SIPC relative to the basic sticky price model. I do
this conditional on historical forecasts. Specifically, I first
follow Carroll (2003) and assume that each quarter, profes-
sional forecasters generate a set of forecasts of macroeco-
nomic variables denoted by Ft[]. There is a continuum of
firms, each of which knows that its instantaneously optimal
price is given by
pt# j  pt  xt,
where pt is the aggregate price level, xt is the output gap,
and  is the degree of real rigidity.
In general, one could assume that both the acquisition of
new forecasts and changing prices are costly. Instead, I will
focus on the two extreme cases: the basic sticky information
and sticky price models. Following Mankiw and Reis (MR
henceforth), the sticky information model consists of two
assumptions. First, the acquisition of new forecasts by firms
follows a Poisson process in which there is a probability
1   that any given firm will acquire a new set of forecasts.
Second, price changes are costless. Jointly, these two as-
sumptions yield the SIPC,
t 
1  

xt  1   
j0

jFt1jt  	xt,
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which relates inflation to the output gap and past forecasts
of current inflation and changes in the output gap.4
Alternatively, one can reverse the assumptions: the ac-
quisition of forecasts is costless and immediate, whereas
price changes are costly. Assuming a Poisson process for
changing prices, in which (1  
) is the probability of
changing prices each quarter, we get the NKPC,
t 
1  
1  



xt  Ftt1,
which relates inflation to the current output gap and the
current forecast of future inflation.5 The key difference lies
in the timing of the expectations in each Phillips curve: the
sticky price model implies that the relationship between the
nominal and the real side of the economy is conditional on
current expectations of future inflation, whereas the sticky
information model implies that past forecasts of the current
state are the relevant measure of expectations in the Phillips
curve. This distinction reflects the alternative assumptions
about the diffusion of information and the costliness of price
changes underlying each model.
To assess the empirical support for the SIPC, I use two
sets of criteria. The first is whether estimation of the
structural parameters of the SIPC yields values consistent
with the theory of the model. The second is to compare its
performance statistically to the NKPC. I consider first how
to adequately estimate the structural parameters of the SIPC
and then turn to the issue of assessing its validity relative to
the sticky price model.
A. Estimating the Sticky Information Phillips Curve
To assess the empirical validity of the SIPC, I first
augment the SIPC with an error term εt, assumed to be
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.):6
t 
1  

xt  1  
 
j0

jFt1jt  	xt  εt.
(1)
Estimating  and  using equation (1) presents several
difficulties. First, the output gap on the right-hand side will
tend to be correlated with the error term.7 This endogeneity
issue can typically be addressed by instrumental variables.
However, the infinite amount of regressors on the right-hand
side must be truncated, adding a source of error that will not
be uncorrelated with lagged instruments. Therefore, the
identification condition that instruments be uncorrelated
with the error term will typically fail. Second, other than the
output gap, all variables on the right-hand side are past
expectations of current values of aggregate inflation and
changes in the output gap. While expectational terms in
NKPC estimations are frequently replaced with ex-post
values (e.g., Gali & Gertler, 1999), doing so in the SIPC
would yield an error process that would be highly correlated
with both regressors and instruments. It is thus critical to
have actual measures of past forecasts as regressors. I
address each of these points in turn.
Endogeneity, Instruments, and Truncation. Consistent
estimation of the parameters of the SIPC requires an iden-
tification condition. Given that the current output gap is a
right-hand-side variable, it will generally not be uncorre-
lated with the error term. Therefore, estimation of equation
(1) by ordinary least squares or nonlinear least squares will
be inconsistent. However, under the assumption of i.i.d.
error terms, past information embodied in lagged values will
be orthogonal to the error term, thereby justifying the
estimation of equation (1) by instrumental variables.
Consider first a truncated version of (1),
t 
1  

xt  1  
 
j0
J1
jFt1jt  	xt  εt, (2)
where I temporarily ignore the truncated subset of the SIPC.
Under the assumption of i.i.d. error terms, one can use the
orthogonality condition E[εtZt1]  0, where Zt1 is a set
of k variables dated t  1 or earlier, to consistently estimate
 and  by nonlinear IV. Efficient estimation of these
parameters requires a set of instruments that satisfy the
orthogonality condition and are sufficiently correlated with
the regressors of (2). Note that all past forecasts on the
right-hand side of (2) are valid instruments, as are lags of
the output gap. In the baseline estimation, I will use lags of
the output gap and a subset of the past forecasts as instru-
ments.
In practice, the truncation that must be imposed on the
SIPC provides an additional source of error into equation
(2). Specifically, equation (2) should be written as
4 See Caballero (1989) and Reis (2006) for microfoundations of the
SIPC based on firms facing fixed costs to acquiring information. Note that
MR impose the additional assumption that professional forecasters have
rational expectations.
5 Deriving this is standard but requires the assumption that forecasters
know and impose in generating their forecasts the equation describing the
price level. Specifically it requires Ftbt1  [Ftpt1  
pt]/(1  
),
where bt is the optimal reset price for firms.
6 The error term can come from measurement error on the left-hand side
or i.i.d. markup shocks.
7 Hausman tests strongly support the notion that the output gap is
correlated with the error term.
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t 
1  

xt  1  
 
j0
J1
jFt1jt  	xt  εt  t,tJ, (2’)
where t, jJ  (1  ) ¥jJ jFt1j (t  	xi).
Because this additional source of error is dated t  J and
earlier, the orthogonality condition will generally fail. How-
ever, consider the covariance of any variable z with t,tj:
covz, t,tJ 1  
jJ

jcovz, Ft1jt
 Ft1j	xt)].
This covariance will be nonzero unless z is uncorrelated
with all forecasts dated t  1  j @j  J of current
inflation and changes in the output gap. However, because
each covariance is weighted by 0  j  1, it follows that
as the truncation point J rises, the covariance of any regres-
sor with t,tJ falls and will converge to 0 as J goes to
infinity as long as the covariance of z with past expectations
is not too explosive. Quantitatively, truncating past expec-
tations should thus have little effect on the estimation for a
large enough J. Monte Carlo exercises confirm that when
the degree of information rigidity is low to moderate, we
can consistently estimate  and  even at low truncation
points.8 As the true value of  rises, we require ever higher
truncation points to consistently estimate  and . When the
true level of information rigidity is   0.75, so that firms
update their information once a year on average, consistent
estimation requires a truncation of approximately one year.
Forecast Measures. To separate the issue of price-
setting decisions from the rationality of forecasts, I rely on
historical measures of forecasts. The first approach is to use
median expectations data from the Survey of Professional
Forecasters (SPF).9 The SPF data provide an ideal source of
expectations because they are a direct measure of what
economists were forecasting and are available on a quarterly
basis.10 Specifically, the SPF provides expected future paths
for prices and real output over each of the subsequent four
quarters from each vintage period. To generate expectations
of changes in the output gap, I assume that forecasters knew
the actual changes in the CBO measure of potential output
and derive expectations of future changes in the output gap
as expected changes in output minus actual changes in the
CBO measure of potential output. The main limitation is
that forecasts are provided for only the next four quarters.
As an alternative, I also generate forecasts for each
quarter in a way designed to closely replicate what fore-
casters would have believed each time period. Specifically,
for each quarterly observation (e.g., 1982:Q1), I follow
Stock and Watson (2003) and run a set of bivariate VARs for
both inflation and changes in the output gap with a set of
predictive variables using real-time data available to agents
at that time.11 These are used to generate forecasts of future
values of inflation and changes in the output gap from each
set of VARs of that vintage, which are then averaged across
(excluding the maximum and minimum forecasts).12 I create
lagged forecasts going as far as twelve periods earlier for
each quarter from 1971:Q2 until 2004:Q2. For inflation
forecasts, I use real-time data of inflation, unemployment,
and changes in the output gap (though the CBO measure
used in the output gap is not real time data), as well as the
final series for the level of short-term interest rates, the
interest rate spread (10 year minus 3 month T-bills), the
second difference of oil prices, the first difference of indus-
trial production index, and capacity utilization. Each VAR
uses only the previous twenty years of data.13 For forecasts
of changes in the output gap, I replace oil prices with the
first difference of M0. The lag length in each VAR is
selected using the AIC.
B. The New Keynesian Phillips Curve and Nonnested
Model Tests
The second criterion to assess the validity of the SIPC is
whether it statistically outperforms alternative models of
inflation dynamics. The natural alternative is the NKPC,
which the SIPC was designed to replace. I first discuss the
estimation procedure for the NKPC and then turn to the tests
used to empirically differentiate between the two models.
New Keynesian Phillips Curve. The NKPC can be ex-
pressed as
t  Ftt1  xt  εt, (3)
where  is the discount factor and  is a function of both
real rigidity and the degree of price stickiness. This rela-
tionship implies that current inflation is proportional to the
current forecast of the present discounted sum of future
output gaps. Because of the purely forward-looking nature
of inflation, this model has been criticized on the grounds
8 These are available from the author on request.
9 SPF data are available at the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Board:
http://www.phil.frb.org/econ/spf/index.html. Mean forecasts were also
used and yielded qualitatively similar results.
10 Other survey measures are not in an appropriate form for this type of
analysis. Either they do not contain forecasts of future quarters one by one,
or they do not yield precise estimates of future values of inflation and
changes in the output gap.
11 Real-time data were taken from Philadelphia Federal Reserve at
http://www.phil.frb.org/econ/forecast/reaindex.html. See Croushore and
Stark (2001) for a description.
12 In addition, I impose that the AR forecast be one of the variables to be
averaged over.
13 Some series are not available over the whole sample. Additional
forecasting variables are added as soon as twenty years’ worth of data
becomes available for that series.
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that it overpredicts the speed at which inflation responds to
monetary policy shocks. MR motivate the sticky informa-
tion model as a direct substitute for the NKPC on the
grounds that the sticky information model can address the
failures of the NKPC. Knowing whether the SIPC outper-
forms the NKPC empirically is thus a particularly interest-
ing question.
I propose to estimate the parameters of the NKPC in a
manner consistent with that used for the SIPC. Namely, the
measures of inflation expectations from the “Forecast Mea-
sures” section can be used as right-hand-side variables in
estimating equation (3).14 Under the assumption that εt is
uncorrelated with all past information, equation (3) can be
estimated by instrumental variables. Instruments used in-
clude a constant, three lags of the output gap, and the time
t  1 forecast of time t  1 inflation.15 Using SPF
expectations, the GDP deflator for inflation, and the log
deviation of output from the CBO measure of potential
output for the output gap, estimation of (3) by instrumental
variables from 1971:Q2 to 2004:Q2 yields
t  0.38 1.12Ftt1  0.04xt  εt
0.26 0.07 0.02
with Newey-West (1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorre-
lation consistent (HAC) standard errors in parentheses. Note
that the coefficient on expected inflation is greater than,
though not statistically different from, 1. The coefficient on
the output gap is positive and statistically significant, as
implied by the theory and noted in Adam and Padula
(2003).16
Nonnested Model Tests. Because the SIPC and the
NKPC are nonnested, I use two approaches to test the
empirical validity of the SIPC relative to the sticky price
alternative. First, I apply the Davidson-McKinnon (DM)
J-test. This entails estimating each model augmented with
the fitted value from the alternative model and testing the
null that the coefficient on the fitted value of the alternative
is 0. For example, under the null of the NKPC, we can
estimate
t  Ftt1  xt  SIˆtSI  εt, (4)
where SI  0 under the null of the NKPC and ˆtSI is the
fitted value from estimating (2).17 Similarly, we can test the
null of the sticky information model using
t 
1  

xt  1  
 
j0
J
jFt1jt  	xt  SPˆtSP  εt, (5)
where ˆtSP is the fitted value from estimating (3) and SP 
0 is the null under the sticky information model.18 Possible
outcomes of the test include rejecting both models, rejecting
neither, or rejecting one and not the other.19
As an alternative but closely related approach, I also
consider an encompassing model test. Specifically, I esti-
mate the following encompassing model,
t  t
SP
,   1  tSI,   εt, (6)
where tSP(
, k) is the NKPC of equation (3) and tSI(, )
is the SIPC of equation (2).20 Hence under this approach, I
estimate the parameters of the two models jointly, along
with the weighting parameter . Under the null of the sticky
price model, we should have   1, while the null of sticky
information is   0.21 As with the DM tests, this approach
can accept one model and reject the other, reject both, or fail
to reject either.
III. Results
Inflation is measured using the implicit GDP price defla-
tor. The output gap is measured as the annualized log
deviation between real GDP and the CBO measure of
potential output. I consider alternative measures of inflation
and the output gap as robustness checks subsequently. All
estimating equations include a constant.
14 Roberts (1997) and Adam and Padula (2003) provide evidence that
using survey measures of expectations of future inflation improves the
empirical performance of the NKPC.
15 While weak instruments are typically an issue in estimates of the
NKPC, the use of expectations measures on the right-hand side mitigates
this problem. One can strongly reject the null of weak instruments using
the tests of Stock and Yogo (2004).
16 Equivalent estimates using VAR-based expectations yield   0.97
(0.05) and   0.02 (0.02). Newey-West standard errors allow serial
correlation of four quarters. Almost identical results hold if labor’s share
is used instead of the output gap. Because much work has been done on
estimating the NKPC, I will not report subsequent estimates of the NKPC
unless these differ from those reported here.
17 This is also estimated by IV using the same instruments as when
estimating the NKPC with the addition of Ft1t.
18 In this case, instruments are the same as when estimating the SIPC
plus one lag of inflation and Ft1t1.
19 See Davidson and McKinnon (2002). Because these estimates are
sometimes sensitive to initial values, I use two sets of initial values (i 
0 and t  1.0) and present results from the one that achieves the lower
value of objective function. The initial values used for other parameters
are the estimated parameters from each Phillips curve.
20 For the encompassing equation, I use all instruments from estimating
the hybrid NKPC and SIPC.
21 Because this expression is highly nonlinear in five parameters, I
estimate the parameters using a Markov chain Monte Carlo approach,
following Chernozhukov and Hong (2003). I impose that 0    1, 0 
  1, 0    1,   0,   0. Starting values for the iterations are  
0.99,   0.75,   0.10,   0.01, and   0.5. I use 10,000 burn-in
iterations and 100,000 subsequent iterations for the estimation. The
standard deviation of shocks is taken from standard errors of parameter
estimates from single-equation estimations, and set to 0.1 for . The
objective function is that of nonlinear IV.
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A. Baseline Results
Table 1 presents estimates of the SIPC in (2), the DM
tests of (4) and (5), and the encompassing model (6) on the
full sample from 1971:Q2 until 2004:Q2 for different trun-
cation points in the SIPC for the two measures of expecta-
tions. We look first at the results based on SPF forecasts,
where the estimates of informational and real rigidities are
both negative and insignificantly different from 0, contra-
dicting the theoretical assumptions of the SIPC that both be
positive. In addition, the SIPC is rejected under both non-
nested model tests. The NKPC is not rejected by the
encompassing model test and only weakly so using the DM
test (at the 10% level). When the real-time VAR forecasts
are used, the results are broadly similar regardless of the
truncation used in the SIPC. Again, the estimates of both
informational and nominal rigidities are insignificantly dif-
ferent from 0, though both are now positive. The nonnested
model tests all reject the SIPC but fail to reject the NKPC.
The evidence is thus unfavorable to the sticky information
model along both sets of criteria considered. First, unlike
the NKPC, the estimated structural parameters of the SIPC
are inconsistent with an underlying sticky information
model since we cannot reject the null that firms update their
information every quarter. Second, the estimated SIPC is
statistically inferior to the NKPC. Thus, by both metrics
considered, the SIPC finds little support in the data.
To see why this may be, it is worthwhile examining the
predicted values of the models. Figure 1 plots inflation and
predicted inflation from the NKPC with   0.99 and  
0.01.22 Overall, predicted inflation from the NKPC tracks
actual inflation closely. It captures the two increases in
inflation of the 1970s and early 1980s, but overpredicts
inflation throughout the mid- to late 1980s. This version of
the NKPC accounts for approximately 80% of the variation
in inflation. Figure 2 plots actual inflation and that predicted
by the SIPC using the real-time VAR forecasts with a
truncation of three years with the parameter values proposed
by MR:   0.75 and   0.10.23 Predicted inflation from
the SIPC accounts for a much smaller fraction of the
variation in inflation, approximately 55%. In addition, this
series differs from the time series of inflation along two
22   0.01 is approximately equivalent to firms updating prices once a
year on average with   0.10.
23 Constants are set to 0 for the NKPC and SIPC.
TABLE 1.—BASELINE ESTIMATES OF SIPC AND NONNESTED MODEL TESTS
SPF Real-Time VAR
J  4 J  4 J  12
A: Estimates of Sticky Information Phillips Curve
c 0.14 (0.22) 0.07 (0.22) 0.07 (0.23)
 0.27 (0.21) 0.21 (0.23) 0.20 (0.22)
 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
B: Nonnested Model Tests
si 0.47* (0.28) 0.37 (0.27) 0.37 (0.27)
sp 1.28*** (0.20) 1.20*** (0.22) 1.13*** (0.10)
 0.94*** (0.07) 0.97*** (0.03) 0.97*** (0.03)
Note: SPF and real-time VAR refer to the source of forecasts used in each equation, c, , and  are the constant and degrees of information and real rigidity in the SIPC (equation (2)), respectively. si and sp
are the coefficients on the fitted values of the SIPC and NKPC in equations (4) and (5), respectively, and  is the weighting parameter in equation (6). J is the truncation used in estimates of the SIPC. All estimates
done by nonlinear IV. See text for instruments. Standard errors in parentheses are Newey-West HAC allowing for four quarters of serial correlations. Statistical difference from 0 (and from 1 for ).
*2 significant at 10%; **22 significant at 5%; ***222significant at 1%.
FIGURE 1.—PREDICTED INFLATION FROM NEW KEYNESIAN PHILLIPS CURVE
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Note: Figure plots inflation and predicted inflation from the NKPC using expectations from VARs on
real-time data and c  0,   0.99, and   0.01.
FIGURE 2.—PREDICTED INFLATION FROM THE STICKY INFORMATION
PHILLIPS CURVE
Note: Figure plots inflation and predicted inflation from the SIPC using expectations from VARs on
real-time data and c  0,   0.75, and   0.10 with a truncation of J  12. It also includes a
four-quarter centered moving average of SPF forecast errors at the one- and four-quarter horizon.
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dimensions. First, predicted inflation fails to replicate the
two inflation spikes of the 1970s and early 1980s and is also
unable to reproduce the disinflation of the mid-1980s. I will
refer to this as the real-time forecast error effect. Second,
predicted inflation is much smoother than actual inflation. I
will refer to this as the inflation inertia effect.
B. Real-Time Forecast Error Effect
The first effect is labeled the real-time forecast error
effect because it reflects a feature specific to real-time
forecasts of inflation: forecast errors are consistently too
low in the 1970s, but too high in the 1980s and 1990s.
Figure 2 illustrates this using a moving average (centered
four-quarter) of SPF forecast errors at horizons of one and
four quarters. During both inflationary episodes in the
1970s, forecast errors are positive, reflecting the fact that
forecasters were caught off-guard by rising inflation rates.
On the other hand, since the Volcker disinflation, profes-
sional forecasters have been consistently overestimating
inflation. Both features are increasing in the forecasting
horizon. The VAR forecasts based on the real-time data
available to forecasters each quarter yield a very similar
pattern.
This has important implications when estimating the
parameters of the SIPC. In particular, a high value of  in
the SIPC places substantial weight on older forecasts of
current inflation. This accounts for why predicted inflation,
under the parameters of Mankiw and Reis, is lower than
actual inflation in the 1970s but consistently higher than
actual inflation in the 1980s and 1990s. Because the esti-
mation seeks to minimize persistent departures between
predicted and actual inflation, we get estimated values of 
that are close to 0; low values of  shift the weight in the
SIPC from old forecasts of current inflation to more recent
forecasts of current inflation, which exhibit a less pro-
nounced pattern of persistent forecast errors.
C. Inflation Inertia Effect
The inflation inertia effect refers to the excessive persis-
tence and insufficient volatility of predicted inflation from
the SIPC. To see this, suppose again we impose the pre-
ferred values of MR:   0.75—firms update their infor-
mation once a year on average—and   0.10—a signifi-
cant amount of real rigidity—on real-time VAR forecasts
with a truncation of three years. The standard deviation of
predicted inflation is 1.78. Actual inflation over the same
time period had a standard deviation of 2.61, which implies
that the SIPC underpredicts the volatility of inflation by
over 30%. In addition, predicted inflation from the SIPC has
an AR(1) coefficient of 0.999, whereas actual inflation has
persistence of 0.88. For comparison, predicted inflation
from the NKPC, assuming   0.99 and   0.01, has a
standard deviation of 2.35 and a persistence of 0.94.
The inflation inertia effect reflects the fact that the SIPC
implies that inflation depends on a weighted average of past
expectations of inflation. When there is a lot of information
rigidity ( is high), the SIPC places substantial weight on
past expectations. This averaging across past expectations
then filters out the volatility in past expectations, leaving
only a smooth series in its wake. Note that this is another
factor that pushes  down in the estimation. With a low ,
most of the weight is placed on the most recent expectation
and little on past forecasts. This eliminates the filtering
process and enables the SIPC to more closely match the
volatility and persistence of inflation. I return to the inflation
inertia effect in section VB.
IV. Robustness
In this section, I investigate several issues that arise in the
context of estimating sticky price and sticky information
models. The first is the choice of series. I verify that my
results are robust to using alternative measures of inflation
as well as labor’s share instead of the output gap, a point
that has received much attention in the sticky price litera-
ture. Second, I consider the use of in-sample forecasts, as
implicitly done in most other empirical work on the SIPC.
Third, I redo the estimation while imposing a coefficient of
real rigidity. Fourth, I examine the evidence for sticky
information in the subperiod since 1984.
A. Robustness to Data Series
In the baseline estimation, the choice of the GDP deflator
and the output gap (defined as the deviation of output from
the CBO measure of potential) was based on limited avail-
ability of SPF forecasts for other series. In this section, I
reproduce out-of-sample VAR forecasts for two alternative
measures of inflation, as well as for the use of labor’s share
instead of the output gap. In each case, I generate forecasts
from each quarter using the data preceding that date. I then
replicate the estimation procedures outlined in section II.
The results for a truncation of the SIPC of three years are
presented in table 2.
With the nonfarm business (NFB) deflator as our measure
of inflation, estimates of the degree of informational and
real rigidities are small but positive and insignificantly
different from 0, confirming the baseline results of table 1.
The SIPC is again rejected according to both nonnested
model tests. However, unlike the baseline results, the NKPC
is also rejected by both nonnested model tests despite the
fact that the estimated parameters of the NKPC (not shown)
are nearly identical to those found previously. This rejection
of the NKPC reflects the fact that the NKPC explains a
smaller fraction of the variation in NFB inflation than GDP
deflator inflation, with an R2 of 0.70 rather than an improved
performance of the SIPC. In particular, NFB inflation is
more volatile than GDP deflator inflation, and expectations
of future inflation are unable to account for this increased
variation in inflation. With CPI inflation, the point estimate
of information rigidity, at 0.40, is larger than in previous
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cases and is significantly different from 0 at the 10% level.
The estimated coefficient of real rigidity remains insignifi-
cantly different from 0. However, the SIPC continues to be
strongly rejected in the nonnested model tests. The NKPC is
also rejected, reflecting the fact that CPI inflation is even
more volatile than NFB inflation, and again this increased
volatility is not sufficiently accounted for by expectations of
future inflation.
I also consider the use of labor’s share as the relevant
forcing variable in each Phillips curve. Gali and Gertler
(1999) argue that labor’s share is a better measure to use
than the output gap since it is more closely tied to marginal
costs. The use of labor’s share in the estimation of the two
Phillips curves has little effect on the estimation results
here. The estimated degrees of informational and real rigid-
ities are insignificantly different from 0. The nonnested
model tests continue to strongly reject the SIPC but fail to
reject the NKPC. Thus, the use of labor’s share does not
qualitatively change any of the results relative to the base-
line estimation.
B. In-Sample Versus Out-of-Sample Forecasts
Previous work on the empirical validity of the SIPC has
typically not rejected the SIPC on structural grounds, with
most finding estimated levels of information rigidity con-
sistent with firms updating their information between once
and twice a year. A key difference between the approach
used here and this previous work is the nature of the
forecasts used. Rather than relying on real-time forecasts,
previous authors have relied on a single VAR estimated over
the whole period to generate expectations.24 Such an ap-
proach, by construction, eliminates the real-time forecast
error effect since forecast errors in the VAR must be i.i.d. To
see that this is important for the estimation, I construct an
alternative set of forecasts using a single VAR with inflation
and changes in the output gap estimated over the whole
sample.25 I then use the VAR coefficients to generate fore-
casts from each time period. The baseline estimation, using
these in-sample forecasts, is redone, and the results are
presented in table 2. Note that the estimated levels of
information rigidity are now positive and statistically sig-
nificant, implying that firms update their information a little
over twice a year on average. However, the estimated
degree of real rigidity remains insignificantly different from
0, and the nonnested model tests continue to strongly reject
the null of the SIPC but fail to reject the null of the NKPC.26
This alternative set of forecasts illustrates the importance
of the real-time forecast error effect. By construction, in-
sample VAR forecasts eliminate the real-time forecast error
effect. Yet the real-time beliefs of forecasters differed sub-
stantially from what they would have forecast had they had
access to information from future values. Since the key idea
behind sticky information is that inflation depends largely
on agents’ beliefs about the current state, the use of histor-
ical forecasts is more appropriate given the very different
patterns exhibited by in-sample forecasts over the same time
period. One should also note that the inflation inertia effect
is present regardless of whether in-sample or out-of-sample
forecasts are used. With in-sample forecasts, the standard
deviation of predicted inflation from the SIPC under the
24 See Dupor et al. (forthcoming), Kiley (2007), and Korenok et al.
(2007). Note that these authors estimate the VAR and the SIPC jointly,
thereby imposing the cross-equation restrictions implied by the rational
expectations solution. Khan and Zhu (2006) is an exception as they rely on
out-of-sample forecasts.
25 The VAR is estimated from 1967:Q1 to 2004:Q2. Lag length is chosen
using the AIC.
26 For the NKPC, the results are largely unchanged. The estimated  is
1.01 (0.01), and the estimate of  is 0.008 (0.003).
TABLE 2.—ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
Alternative Data Series In-Sample Forecasts Impose   0.1 Post-1984
NFB CPI LS J  4 J  12 SPF
VAR
(J  12) SPF
VAR
(J  12)
A: Estimates of Sticky Information Phillips Curve
c 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.33*** 0.27*** 0.62*** 0.20 0.41 0.81***
(0.26) (0.26) (0.20) (0.11) (0.10) (0.22) (0.28) (0.35) (0.31)
 0.10 0.40* 0.17 0.37*** 0.42*** 0.52*** 0.53*** 0.75*** 0.94***
(0.23) (0.20) (0.20) (0.12) (0.13) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.01)
 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.10 0.04 0.54
(0.02) (0.06) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) n.a. n.a. (0.05) (0.33)
B: Nonnested Model Tests
si 0.27** 0.30** 0.34 0.28 0.27 0.14 0.14 0.08 0.14
(0.11) (0.15) (0.25) (0.29) (0.27) (0.24) (0.23) (0.79) (0.66)
sp 0.95*** 1.00*** 1.31*** 0.82*** 0.98*** 1.53*** 1.15*** 1.03*** 0.97***
(0.12) (0.13) (0.17) (0.11) (0.03) (0.15) (0.10) (0.34) (0.31)
 0.73***,aaa 0.72***,aaa 0.98*** 0.93*** 0.92*** 0.95*** 0.96*** 0.79*** 0.78***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.07) (0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (0.15) (0.16)
Note: NFB uses nonfarm business deflator series for inflation. CPI uses the consumer price index for inflation. Labor’s share replaces the output gap as the forcing term in the Phillips curves. In each case under
“Alternative Data Series,” expectations are generated by VARs using data from these series and others as described in the “Forecast Measures” section of text. “In-Sample Forecasts” uses forecasts based on a single
VAR estimated over the whole sample. c, , and  are the constant and degrees of information and real rigidity in the SIPC—equation (2) in text—respectively. Parameters si and sp are the coefficients on the
fitted values of the SIPC and NKPC in equations (4) and (5), respectively, and  is the weighting parameter in equation (6). All estimates done by nonlinear IV from 1971:Q2 to 2004:Q2, except for post-1984
estimates. See text for instruments. Standard errors in parentheses are Newey-West HAC allowing for four quarters of serial correlation. Statistical difference from 0 (and from one for ) at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels are denoted by a *(a), **(aa), and ***(aaa) respectively.
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assumed parameters of MR is 25% less than that of actual
inflation.
C. Imposing the Degree of Real Rigidity
In this section, I consider the implications of imposing
a degree of real rigidity in the estimation of the SIPC as
a way of more precisely estimating the degree of infor-
mation rigidity.27 In particular, I focus on the case of  
0.10, the value assumed by MR. Low values of  imply
substantial strategic complementarities in price setting
among firms and are necessary for the sticky information
model to deliver a delayed response of inflation to mon-
etary policy shocks.28 In addition, because substantial
amounts of real rigidity are necessary for sticky price
models to match the persistence in the data, imposing this
value does not bias, ex ante, the exercise in favor of
either model.29 For the NKPC and SIPC to have identical
degrees of freedom, I also restrict the coefficient on the
output gap in the NKPC to be   0.01. Note that the
latter is equivalent to imposing   0.10, and firms
update prices approximately once a year on average.
These values are also imposed in each nonnested model
test.
The results are also presented in table 2. Note that the
estimated levels of information rigidity are now 0.52 and
0.53 for SPF and real-time VAR (truncation of three years)
forecasts, respectively, and are significantly different from 0
at the 1% level. However, the nonnested model tests again
reject the null of the SIPC but fail to reject the NKPC. Thus,
while the SIPC continues to fare poorly on statistical
grounds, it appears to fare better on structural grounds,
according to the first criterion. The reason that estimates of
information rigidity are higher with this imposed value of 
is as follows. In the unrestricted case, the estimate of  must
be close to 0 to minimize both the real-time forecast error
and the inertia effects. But the data imply a small and
positive link between inflation and the output gap, as seen in
the estimates of the NKPC. Note that the coefficient on the
output gap term in the SIPC is (1  )/. If the estimate
of  must be close to 0, then  must be small as well to
avoid having a large coefficient on the output gap. This is
what occurs in the unrestricted estimation. But when  is
imposed to be greater than its unrestricted estimated value,
this magnifies the coefficient on the output gap. To offset
this effect requires higher estimated values of .
To illustrate this effect more clearly, I reproduce esti-
mates of the degree of information rigidity for levels of 
between 0 and 0.5. Parameter estimates and standard errors
are shown in figure 3. Note that estimates of  are rising
monotonically with , consistent with the explanation
above. However, as the estimated degree of information
rigidity rises, the real-time forecast error and inflation iner-
tia effects become increasingly present, and the empirical fit
of the model declines. This is illustrated by the fact that the
R2 of the SIPC is rapidly declining in . Interestingly, this
is not the case for the NKPC, for which the empirical fit is
27 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
28 See Coibion (2006).
29 Woodford (2003) argues that plausible values of  are between 0.10
and 0.15.
FIGURE 3.—ESTIMATED LEVELS OF INFORMATION RIGIDITY, CONDITIONAL ON THE DEGREE OF REAL RIGIDITY
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Note: The figure displays estimated levels of information rigidity () for different imposed values of real rigidity () when estimating the SIPC. The figure also displays the implied R2 for the SIPC for each value
of , as well as the corresponding R2 from the estimated NKPC.
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much more robust to the assumed value of .30 Figure 3
illustrates this by showing the implied R2 of predicted
inflation from the NKPC with imposed values of . Essen-
tially there is an empirical trade-off between the two criteria
for assessing the SIPC: when we impose values of  that
yield levels of information rigidity consistent with a delayed
response of inflation to monetary policy shocks, the statis-
tical fit of the SIPC worsens substantially relative to the
NKPC, reflecting the real-time forecast error and inflation
inertia effects.
D. Subsample Estimates
One could argue that applying the SIPC to the 1970s is
expecting too much of the model. Since this was a period of
volatile output and inflation, in which these economic vari-
ables were much in the news, the time-dependent process
underlying the sticky information model may be a particu-
larly poor assumption (though the same could potentially be
said for the sticky price model). In addition, Khan and Zhu
(2006) perform a similar analysis for the SIPC and find
plausible and statistically significant values of , but their
estimates are from 1980:Q1 on. To see whether the time
sample is important, table 2 presents results from replicating
the baseline estimation since the first quarter of 1984. The
post-1984 period is frequently referred to as the “great
moderation,” in which the volatility of output and inflation
is greatly reduced relative to the previous period. As such, it
is a natural break point to impose.31
Note first that the estimated levels of information rigidity
differ from those over the whole time period. Point esti-
mates of the degree of information rigidity are all statisti-
cally positive and relatively high. With SPF forecasts,  is
estimated to be 0.75, exactly the value assumed by MR.
Real-time VAR forecasts point to higher levels of informa-
tion rigidity, reaching 0.94 at a truncation of twelve quar-
ters. Note that   0.94 implies that firms update their
information once every four years on average. The esti-
mated levels  remain insignificantly different from 0 in
each case. The nonnested model tests again reject the SIPC
but fail to reject the NKPC. However, the point estimates of
 imply that a larger weight is now placed on the SIPC than
was the case over the whole sample, implying that its
empirical fit has improved relative to that of the NKPC over
this subsample period. Nonetheless, we cannot reject that
  1 but can strongly reject the null of   0.
Overall, the sticky information model clearly performs
better over this subsample period along one dimension:
estimates of the degree of information rigidity are now
significantly different from 0. However, the fact that 
remains insignificantly different from 0 implies that it is still
difficult to find any strong link between the nominal and real
side of the economy when conditioning on past forecasts of
the current state. In addition, the sticky information model
continues to be strongly rejected against the alternative of
the basic sticky price model using nonnested model tests,
confirming that statistically, the SIPC is outperformed by
the simple sticky price model it was designed to replace.
V. Discussion
In this section, I delve more deeply into two puzzling
results presented in the paper. The first is the difference in
the estimated levels of information rigidity over the whole
sample and since the 1980s. The second is the inflation
inertia effect: why predicted inflation from the SIPC under
the parameters of Mankiw and Reis appears to be so much
more inertial than actual inflation.
A. Subsample Estimates of Information Rigidity and
Rationality of Forecasts
The most striking feature of the subsample estimates is
the high estimated degrees of information rigidity. These
stand in sharp contrast to those found over the whole
sample, which were low and not statistically different from
0. While the estimate of  remains insignificantly different
from 0 and the nonnested model tests are consistent across
periods, the large difference across periods in estimated
degrees of information rigidity appears puzzling. In this
section, I argue that this subsample difference arises be-
cause persistent forecast errors on the part of professional
forecasters can give the appearance of sticky information in
price-setting decisions, even in the absence of sticky infor-
mation on the part of firms.
There is a large literature on the rationality of survey
measures of inflation expectations, the principal result of
which has been that inflation forecasts often appear to be
rational in the long run but not the short run.32 To verify this,
I perform the following test of the rationality of the fore-
casts used in the estimation of the SIPC,
t  Ft1t  c  Ftjt  εt, (7)
for different lagged expectations.33 The resulting values of
ˆ , along with 95% confidence intervals, are presented in
figure 4 for SPF and real-time VAR forecasts. The key issue
here is whether forecast errors are predictable using older
forecasts. The results confirm previous findings that fore-
casts appear to be consistent with rationality in the long run
30 This is due to the fact that a change in  has a smaller effect on the
coefficient on the output gap in the NKPC than in the SIPC, when one
assumes identical degrees of price stickiness and sticky information.
31 See McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000). The results are qualitatively
unchanged for different break points from the early to mid-1980s.
32 See Croushore (1998) and Roberts (1998) for evidence and a survey
of this literature, respectively.
33 Under the null of rational expectations, Working (1960) shows that the
error term in equation (10) is MA(1). Hence, for j  1, I estimate equation
(10) by IV using a constant and three lags of inflation as instruments. For
j  1, the right-hand-side variables are orthogonal to the error term, and
OLS is consistent. Newey-West HAC standard errors are calculated using
a truncation equal to j  1 to take into account overlapping observations.
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(at least according to this test) but not in the short run. Over
the whole sample, there is little evidence that forecast errors
of inflation are predictable using old forecasts. However,
since the early 1980s, forecast errors have been highly
predictable, even using very outdated forecasts. The latter is
due to the pattern of falling inflation over this time period,
which has left professional forecasters consistently overes-
timating inflation. The result, as could be seen in figure 2, is
a period in which forecast errors are persistent and highly
predictable.34
Because the SIPC relates current inflation to past fore-
casts of inflation, periods with predictable and persistent
forecast errors could lead to nonzero estimates of , even in
the absence of delayed information acquisition by price
setters. To assess whether this pattern of predictable forecast
errors is sufficient to explain the difference between sub-
sample estimated values of , I consider a Monte Carlo
exercise in which firms face no costs to acquiring new
forecasts. Specifically, I assume that firms face sticky prices
but not sticky information, so that the NKPC holds, condi-
tional on professional forecasts. The main components of
the model closely follow Erceg and Levin (2003):
t  ˜tt1  xt  εt
 (8)
xt  ˜txt1  1    xt1  it  ˜tt1 (9)
it  it1  1  t  *t  	y	yt, (10)
where (8) is the NKPC conditional on expected inflation, (9)
is the Euler equation for the output gap xt conditional on
expectations of the future output gap and the real interest
rate, and (10) is a Taylor rule describing interest rate
decisions by the central bank. The Taylor rule implies that
the central bank responds to deviations of inflation from a
stochastic target rate *t. The target rate is observable by
forecasters, but its components are not. The target rate
follows:
*t  t
p  εt
q
, (11)
where εtq is an i.i.d. shock and tp follows an AR(1) process
with persistence parameter p. Forecasters use a Kalman
filter to generate optimal forecasts of inflation, the inflation
target, and the output gap conditional on the observable
variables and the known structure of the model. These
expectations are denoted by ˜t.
To generate a pattern of forecast errors similar to that
observed in U.S. data, the shocks to the permanent compo-
nent of the inflation target are chosen so that the permanent
component of target inflation in each simulation is equal to
U.S. HP-filtered inflation over the whole sample. This
ensures an upward trend in inflation in the 1970s followed
by a gradual disinflation in the 1980s and 1990s. The other
shocks in the model are assumed to be normally distribut-
ed.35 The model is simulated 10,000 times, with each
simulation having a burn-in period of 45 quarters followed
by 133 periods approximating the period from 1971:Q2 to
2004:Q2.36 The standard deviation of i.i.d. shocks to the
NKPC is set equal to the standard deviation of the observed
residuals from the NKPC (0.0027). The natural level of
output follows an AR(1) process with persistence of n 
0.99 and i.i.d. shocks with standard deviation of 0.007.
This approach, on average, replicates the qualitative pat-
terns of forecast error bias and predictability in each sub-
sample, as well as over the whole period. Given these
generated data, I estimate the SIPC in the same way as done
in the empirical analysis with a truncation J  4 and J 
12 over the whole sample and the post-1984 equivalent
period using ˜t as the measure of forecasts. Mean estimates
of the degree of information rigidity from 10,000 simula-
tions are presented in table 3. First, the median estimated
level of information rigidity over the whole sample is close
to 0, as found in the baseline results. This follows from the
fact that there is no sticky information in the model and that
forecast errors are unpredictable on average over the whole
period, as in the data. Median estimates of  are also quite
small, as observed in the baseline results. Second, the mean
estimate of  in the subsample period is high: 0.60 on
34 Note that predictable forecast errors do not necessarily imply that
forecasters are irrational. For example, they could be setting forecasts
optimally conditional on limited information about the state of the econ-
omy or uncertainty about the goals (or credibility) of monetary policy-
makers.
35 I set the standard deviation of i.i.d. shocks to the inflation target equal
to 0.002.
36 I set   0.99,   0.01,   0.5, and   0.90. Following Erceg and
Levin (2003), I set the Kalman gain parameter equal to 0.13 and p 
0.999. The standard deviation of temporary shocks to the inflation target
is set to 0.002.
FIGURE 4.—TESTS OF RATIONALITY OF REAL-TIME INFLATION FORECASTS
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Note: The figure presents estimates of ˆ from the regression t  Ft1t  c  Ftjt  εt, for
SPF and real-time VAR forecasts over different samples with 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors
are Newey-West HAC allowing for serial correlation of order j  1. The horizontal axis denotes the
timing (lag) of the expectation on the right-hand side.
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average using a truncation of one year and 0.82 with a
truncation of three years. The mean estimated  is also
increasing in the estimated level of , as observed in the
empirical results.
This exercise illustrates how the gradual adjustment of
forecasts, here due to imperfect information, can mistakenly
lead one to conclude that sticky information is an important
component of price-setting decisions. The presence of pre-
dictable forecast errors since the 1980s can account for what
appear to be high estimated levels of information rigidity
over this time period, even though firms are continually
acquiring updating forecasts. Of course, the presence of
predictable forecast errors points to the potential importance
of informational rigidities on the part of professional fore-
casters. Whether these should be modeled as sticky infor-
mation agents as argued by Mankiw et al. (2003) or as
agents who imperfectly observe the current state, as done in
Erceg and Levin (2003), is an open question.37 One advan-
tage of the limited information approach used in this paper
is to be able to focus on the price and information decisions
firms make without having to take a stand on the model that
applies to forecasters.
B. Inflation Inertia Effect
A striking feature of predicted inflation from the SIPC
under the parameters of Mankiw and Reis is that it is much
more inertial than either actual inflation or predicted infla-
tion from the sticky price model. This result, which is
largely independent of whether in-sample or out-of-sample
forecasts are used, is particularly surprising because the
sticky information model was designed specifically to
match the inflation inertia observed in response to monetary
shocks that sticky price models could not replicate. Mankiw
and Reis explicitly argue that this is the key empirical fact
that is hard to match. Their model, with a sufficient com-
bination of informational and real rigidities, is successful at
matching this fact. Yet empirically, with this same combi-
nation of informational and real rigidities, it appears to do a
worse job of matching the aggregate unconditional time-
series properties of inflation than the model it was designed
to replace.
To see how this dichotomy could exist, consider the
pattern of responses to identified monetary policy shocks as
typically observed in the empirical literature: interest rates
adjust rapidly, the response of output peaks after approxi-
mately six months, but the peak response of inflation does
not occur until one to two years after the shock.38 Now
suppose that there were no other shocks in the economy or
that other shocks yielded a similar pattern of responses; then
in the aggregate data, inflation would tend to lag other
macroeconomic variables, particularly interest rates and
output. Table 4 presents cross-correlations of inflation with
other macroeconomic variables from 1971:Q2 to 2004:Q2.
Note first that the peak correlation (in absolute value)
between inflation and output growth is contemporaneous.
However, the correlation between current inflation and fu-
ture values of output growth is greater than the correlation
between current inflation and lagged values of inflation.
Clearly inflation does not lag output growth. With respect to
labor’s share, the peak correlation is also contemporaneous,
and correlations with leads and lags are highly symmetric,
indicating little evidence of inflation leading or lagging
labor’s share. With respect to the output gap and unemploy-
ment, inflation is most highly correlated with future values
of these variables, indicating that it strongly leads. A similar
pattern holds with respect to both short- and long-term
interest rates: inflation leads these variables. Overall, infla-
tion does not appear to be a lagging indicator.
The fact that the lead-lag patterns observed after mone-
tary policy shocks differ substantially from those in the
aggregate data need not be surprising. Empirical work
typically finds that monetary policy shocks do not explain
37 Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2008b) study the response of forecast
errors and disagreement among forecasters after identified structural
shocks and find that professional forecasters respond in a manner more
consistent with imperfect information than sticky information.
38 See Christiano et al. (1999).
TABLE 3.—ESTIMATING THE SIPC IN THE ABSENCE OF STICKY INFORMATION
Whole Sample Subsample
J  4 J  12 J  4 J  12
 0.06 0.08 0.60 0.82
(0.29) (0.12) (0.35) (0.18)
 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.33
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.14)
Note: The table presents mean estimates of the degree of information rigidity () in the SIPC when the
true model has sticky prices but no sticky information, and forecast errors replicate, on average, those in
the data. See section VA for details. J is the truncation applied to the SIPC in the estimation. Results come
from 10,000 simulations of 133 periods each. Standard deviations of parameter estimates are in
parentheses. The subsample period is equivalent to post-1984 estimates in previous sections.
TABLE 4.—CROSS-CORRELATION OF INFLATION WITH OTHER MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES
(t, Xtj)
8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
GDP growth 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.16 0.18 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.21 0.20 0.13 0.09 0.05 0.08
Labor’s share 0.39 0.40 0.43 0.49 0.53 0.56 0.59 0.62 0.63 0.60 0.56 0.54 0.53 0.52 0.49 0.46 0.46
Unemployment rate 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.15 0.19 0.26 0.34 0.42 0.50 0.57 0.62 0.67 0.72 0.75
GDP gap 0.04 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.12 0.20 0.27 0.35 0.42 0.48 0.52 0.55 0.59
3-month T-bills 0.07 0.13 0.20 0.29 0.37 0.43 0.49 0.55 0.59 0.61 0.63 0.63 0.61 0.60 0.58 0.56 0.56
10-year bonds 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.14 0.20 0.26 0.32 0.38 0.44 0.50 0.55 0.59 0.60 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.63
Note: The table presents the correlation between inflation at time t and each variable at time t  j, where j is given by the numbers at the top of the table. The values in bold indicate the timing of the highest
correlation (in absolute value) between inflation and that variable. All correlations are done from 1971:Q2 until 2004:Q2.
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much of the variation in inflation: Andres, Lopez-Salido,
and Nelson (2005) find that monetary policy shocks account
for approximately 10% of the variance in inflation, Coibion
and Gorodnichenko (2008a) find less than 10%, and Altig et
al.’s (2005) results point to 14% of the variance of inflation
being accounted for by monetary policy shocks.39 Second,
other identified shocks appear to yield more rapid responses
of inflation. In particular, recent work on identifying tech-
nology shocks through long-run restrictions has uncovered
that inflation appears to respond most strongly on impact.40
In addition, variance decompositions indicate that technol-
ogy shocks account for up to 50% of the variance in
inflation. The fact that aggregate inflation does not appear to
lag other macroeconomic variables could thus just be a
reflection of the small fraction of the inflation variance
accounted for by monetary policy shocks and the fact that
other more quantitatively important shocks yield a more
rapid response of inflation.
This has important implications when estimating models
based on aggregate data that inherits these features. The
sticky information model, while able to match the response
to monetary shocks, does so by building in inflation inertia.
This also tends to produce a delayed response of inflation to
other shocks, including technology shocks (see Trabandt,
2005). Because these seem to account for a much greater
fraction of the variance of inflation than monetary policy
shocks, the SIPC is strongly rejected when tested using
aggregate unconditional data. The sticky price model, on the
other hand, builds in forward-looking inflation. This can
readily replicate the response of inflation to technology
shocks but not monetary policy shocks. However, because
the latter account for a smaller fraction of the variance in
inflation, the NKPC fares better in the data.
The implication is that the delayed response of inflation
to monetary policy shocks is only one piece of the puzzle.
The other piece is that inflation overall is not a lagging
indicator. Matching both sets of facts requires a model that
can predict a rapid response of inflation to certain shocks,
like technology shocks, and a gradual response of inflation
to policy shocks.41 This issue is not limited to the basic
sticky price and sticky information models. For example,
Trabandt (2005) shows that a hybrid sticky price model that
can replicate the delayed response of inflation to monetary
policy shocks also implies a delayed response of inflation to
technology shocks. Altig et al. (2005) estimate a sticky
wage model with indexation by minimizing the distance
between the model’s predicted responses for macroeco-
nomic variables and those observed in the data in response
to identified monetary policy and technology shocks. Their
estimates imply significant indexation of wages, allowing
them to match the delayed response of inflation to monetary
policy shocks. However, their model then counterfactually
predicts a delayed response of inflation to technology
shocks. Edge, Laubach, and Williams (2003) pursue a sim-
ilar exercise but reach the opposite conclusion: they find
little evidence for indexation of wages. Their model
matches the rapid response of inflation to identified tech-
nology shocks but is then unable to match the delayed
response of inflation to monetary policy shocks. This dif-
ferentiated response of inflation to shocks in the data im-
plies that models with standard mechanisms for inducing
inflation inertia are unlikely to be able to replicate both sets
of facts jointly.
VI. Conclusion
Mankiw and Reis (2002) argue that the sticky informa-
tion model, in which firms acquire new information infre-
quently but update prices continuously, should replace the
sticky price model, in which firms acquire information
continuously but change prices infrequently, as the work-
horse model of monetary economics. Their primary moti-
vation is that, unlike the sticky price model, the sticky
information model can replicate a key stylized fact: mone-
tary policy shocks have a delayed effect on inflation. I show
that empirically the sticky price model strongly dominates
the sticky information model conditional on historical in-
flation forecasts. There are two primary sources for this
result. First, real-time inflation forecasts are consistently too
low in the 1970s but too high since the 1980s, particularly
at long horizons. The sticky information model, based on
parameters that enable it to match the delayed response of
inflation to monetary policy shocks, places significant
weight on older forecasts and therefore underpredicts infla-
tion in the 1970s but overpredicts it since the 1980s.
Second, the sticky information model predicts excessive
smoothness in inflation and that inflation should lag other
macroeconomic variables. I argue that in the data, inflation
is not a lagging indicator, which reflects the fact that some
nonmonetary policy shocks predict rapid adjustment of
inflation. The sticky information model, which builds in a
delayed response of inflation to shocks, is thus unable to
match this important element in the data and, as a result,
fares poorly empirically.
There is a strong symmetry in the weaknesses of the two
models. The literature has long emphasized the inability of
the basic sticky price model to predict gradual responses of
inflation to monetary policy shocks. However, recent work
has also demonstrated that in response to technology
shocks, inflation adjusts rapidly. The sticky price model can
naturally replicate this feature. The sticky information
model, on the other hand, can reproduce the delayed re-
sponse of inflation to monetary policy shocks but is then
unable to match the rapid response of inflation to technol-
ogy shocks. Because aggregate data indicate that inflation
fails to lag other macroeconomic variables, shocks that yield
39 See also Leeper, Sims, and Zha (1996) and Christiano et al. (1999) for
similar results for the price level.
40 See Gali (1999), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Vigfusson (2003),
Edge, Laubach, and Williams (2003), and Dupor, Han, and Tsai (2009).
41 This point is emphasized in Dupor et al (2009).
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rapid adjustment of inflation explain much of the variance in
inflation. It should thus not be surprising ex post to see the
NKPC dominate the SIPC empirically.
The key implication is that a successful model must be
able to match both sets of facts: rapid adjustment of
inflation to technology (and possibly other) shocks, as
well as a delayed response of inflation to monetary policy
shocks. Reconciling the two facts will likely require
elements of both price stickiness and informational fric-
tions. The fact that the NKPC does so well empirically
when estimated conditional on historical inflation fore-
casts points to the need to model both price and infor-
mational rigidities.42 For example, in the model of Erceg
and Levin (2003) used in the Monte Carlo exercise, the
presence of uncertainty about the monetary policy target
induces agents to slowly adjust their forecasts about
future inflation after a permanent shock to the inflation
target, causing inflation to respond more slowly than in a
full-information environment. Yet the fact that technol-
ogy is observable yields a rapid adjustment of inflation to
productivity shocks.43 Alternatively, one could model a
menu cost environment in which firms observe their
inputs and productivity perfectly but face idiosyncratic
unobservable shocks to their demand. In such an envi-
ronment, inflation will respond rapidly to productivity
shocks but slowly to demand shocks since firms will seek
to delay paying the menu cost until they are sufficiently
confident that a persistent aggregate demand shock has
occurred. Making further progress on modeling inflation
dynamics is likely to require more refined approaches to
modeling the interaction of price-setting decisions with
information acquisition and diffusion processes across
the population.
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